FROM THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC INFLUENCE

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~ Spinboydotcom


23 July 2007

"Shaping" - Enlisting Madison Avenue

Shaping = Framing + Spin + Agenda-Driven Actions.
~ Spinboydotcom










Shaping, in traditional U.S. military parlance, refers to battlefield activities designed to constrain adversary force options or increase friendly force options. It is exemplified in the U.S. landing at the Port of Inch’on, which caused the redeployment of North Korean forcesthreatening the city of Pusan and dramatically altered the course of the Korean War.

Recent analysis of field requirements and joint urban doctrine has expanded the concept of shaping to include influencing resident populations in military operational theaters. These populations constitute a significant component of stability operations, particularly through their decision to support friendly force objectives or those of the adversary.

Virtually every action, message, and decision of a force shapes the opinions of an indigenous population: how coalition personnel treat civilians during cordon-and-search operations, the accuracy or inaccuracy of aerial bombardment, and the treatment of detainees. Unity of message is key in this regard.

The panoply of U.S. force actions must be synchronized across the operational battle space to the greatest extent possible so as not to conflict with statements made in communications at every level, from the President to the soldier, sailor,marine, or airman in the theater of operations.

Given the inherent difficulty in unifying coalition messages across disparate organizations, within and across governments, and over time, shaping efforts must be designed, war-gamed, and conducted as a campaign. The goal of such a shaping campaign is to foster positive attitudes among the populace toward U.S. and allied forces. These attitudes, while not the goal in and of themselves, help decrease anticoalition behaviors and motivate the population to act in ways that facilitate friendly force operational objectives and the attainment of desired end states.

“Every action U.S. forces take sends a message to civilian populations and shapes their attitudes and behavior,” said Todd Helmus, a RAND associate behavioral scientist and lead author of the report. “It's not just a matter of putting the right ‘spin' on U.S. military actions, because words alone won't win public support. Instead, U.S. forces need to take the right actions if they want to get the local support that's crucial to America's counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

“The central feature of consumer marketing is: know your target audience so you can satisfy their needs,” Helmus added. “The U.S. armed forces need to know who the civilian populations of Iraq and Afghanistan are, apply that knowledge through day-to-day operations, and monitor how those civilian populations perceive U.S. operations in their countries. Then the military can adjust operations to get more civilian support.”

Adversaries fabricate stories and events that paint the United States and its armed forces in a negative light. U.S. kinetic operations,especially those that inflict civilian casualties, can provide the backdrop for adversaries’ shaping efforts. Both PA and PSYOP personnel should be involved in planning and war-gaming kinetic and other relevant operations; they can help spot adversaries’ shaping opportunities and assist in planning effective mitigation strategies. The United States should counter potentially damaging false allegations with fact and transparency, enlisting the help of allies and indigenous partners who may more credibly correct misrepresentations.